Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to ""amine whether infonnation on intellectual capital (non-_financial illfornmtlun on knowledge based resources} is disclosed ill [}J.nish IPO prospCt""1uscs. Further, to analyse whether this mluntary di&:losure has changed in the period from 1999 to 2001 and to analyse what factors can e"-plain the amount of disclosure in the prospo::tuses, Design/methodology/approach -The paper uses content analysis to compile a mt'asure of disdosl.rre on each prosp,,'tus and ,;tatistiGil analysis to test wheth(~' thl'fe is an assoc'iation b"twttl1 disclosure and company ty-pe, rhe existence of managerial "wnership befm"" the 1]'0, the size of the conlpany or (he age of the firrn. Findings -Based on statistical analysis, it is concluded that the extent of managelial ownership p1ior to the !I'O and industry type affects the amount of voluntary intellecttml capital disclosure, while company size and age do not affect disclosure, 'The results are interpreted in the light of the increasing imjXn-tance of disdC";ing infonnation on value drivers, strategy and intellectual capital to the capital market and constitute a contribution to the ongoing debate on corporate reporting pradices.
Introduction
In recent years, companies' disclosure of infomlation has gained increased attention due to globalisatioll and integration of capital markets, greater mobility of monetary and actual goods, lOugher competition, new dominating industries, and developments ill IT and the inlemeL Reports (e.g. Eustace. 2001 : F ASB, 2001 ; Upton, 2001 ) and academic contributions (e.g. Lev, 2000; Beattie and Pratt, 2002a, b) have argued that demand for extemal communication o[ information on knowledge-based resources is ---------growing as companies increasingly base their competitive strength and thus the value of their company on know-how, patents, skilled employees and other intangibles. This demand for external communication applies to both traditional annual reporting and newer types of repOt1ing 5uch as intellectual capital statements, supplementary business reporting and prospectuses. The Scandinavian countries are often noticed for their practices wilh respect to disclosure of intellectual capital (e.g. Holland, 2004, p. 
II). Especially the Danish
Government initiatives with publishing a guideline for intellectual capital statements (DATI, 2001 ; DMSTI, 20(3) has been highlighted as an e;,\an1ple of state-of-the-art disclosure models and business reporting (e.g. DiPiazr.a and Eccles. 21.1)2, pp. 72-73; Fincham and Roslender, 2003, p. 71) .
In this paper, we analyse the disclosure of inIomlatiol1 in Danish initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses from the last 12 years, primarily with respet.i to voltmtary disclosure of non-accounting infom1ation on knowledge-based resources -also called intellectual capital. The methodology used in the analY5is is a disclosure index consisting of 78 items. Disclosure index resmrch in accounting and business re{Xlrting practices has been widely applied (IVlarston and Shrives, 1991; Guthrie ei al., 2(XM) .
because such studies represent an aspect of disclosure quality that can be captured by summary measures (Beattie et al, 2CXl2a) .
The remainder of the paper is stnlctured as follows. First recent trends in business reporting are discussed and it is argued that the IPO prospectuses should be studied in order to g'din insight into the need for disclosure. Further, the section presents the factors that will be taken into consideration in explaining differences in discloSlll'e. In the following, two sections the mel hodology and the available data is described. Then, the results are presented and analysed and the paper is concluded with suggestions for further research.
Business reporting and companies' external communication
The relative importance of physical a.."c;;ets such as plant. equipment and stocks, compared to, for example, patent'>, skilled employees and strategic relationships, are declining. These changes in value creation have led many companies to experiment with new modes of external communication --modes that convey information not presently incorporated in financial repOl1s. The altematives \',n)' from mass media communication, via business reporting models and inlemet reporting to a wide spectrum of stakeholders, to disclosure through investor relations meetings and private meetings between company management and institl1tional investors and analysts (Ilolland, 1997; Beattie, 1999; Beattie and Pratt, 2CJOl) .
Among others Blair and Wallman (2001, p. 59) have argue i<Jr the necessity of a modd for business reporting that retleds the dynamics of wealth (Teation and Gelb (2002) have indicated that supplementary disclosure is an important medium tor firms with significant levels of intangible assets. In relation to this, Galbraith and Merrill (20m) suggest that information on comp,my strategy is incorporated into investors' det.-isions, and that infonnation on intellectual capital -espet.;ally m,magemenl experience -does have an effecl on the valuation of the company. One of the instruments that have been suggested as a tool lxllh for identifying, managing and repoliing intellectual capital and intangibles is the intellet.iual capital statement (see DMSTI, 2003; Zambon, 2(03) .
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Even though the precise definition of a report OIl intellectual Gipital in the literature ---------is connected with some ambiguousness, the statements that have been disclosed in Denmark since 1991:) where Co]oplast as the first finn issued an intellectual capital statement haw many similarities. 'vlost often intellectual capital is defined as knowledge resources, in the form of employees, customers, proces..-;es or technology, which the company can mobili7.€ in its value creation prO<:e--'''eS. In practice intellectual capital statements contain various fimmc-ial and non-financial iniomration, i.e. staff turnovers and job satisfaction, in·service trdining, tmnover split on L'Uslomers, customer satisfaction, precision of supply etc. (see Rukh ct al., 2001 ; Mouritsen et aL.
20 (1) . as well as a substantial narrative pari positioning the indicators within it strategic framework. There is no doubt that the general reporting practices with respect to voluntary disclosures is especially well-developed in Denmark and it might be argued that studying the disclosure of intellectual capital in a Danish or Scandinavi<m context would be misleading if generalized to a wider institutional contexL However, this does not necessarily indicate that the practices have influenced the decision-makers with respect to disclosures in 11'0 prospectuses, namely the investment banks. Furthenuore.
it should be taking into account that the first Danish Ie reports were published in 1998 while our sample spans more years. Another interpretation of the results from studying a Danish context could be that is presently the Danish case may be the fLlture in other countries.
\'arious studies of investors' and analysts' infonmtion demands indicate a substantial difference bet ween tile types of information fOlmd in companies' annual reports and the types of information delTh'mded by the market (Eccles el aI, 2001: Eccles and iVlavrinac, 1995). In c(X)peration with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland aCAS), Beattie (1999) studied the ability of finanl-ial reponing to satisiy users' demands. The results illustrated that although non-financial infomlation still has lower priority than traditional financial infonnation; users consider disclosure regarding risk factors and quality of management to be insufficient.
Theoretically. additional releYanr non-financial infol111ation is expected to lower the cost of equity capital (see \'em~cchia, 20(1) because increased disclosure lowers investor uncertainty about the future prospects of the company and facilitates a more prel-ise valuation of the company (Botosan, 1997). Related to this argument, the disclosure of information on intellectual capital is expet.i.ed to reduce infolTnation asymmetry ane! to enhance stock market liquidity and in,"Tease demand for companies' securities (for exan1ple Diamond and Ven-ecchia, 1991) . Roth Botosan (1997) and Richardson and 'Weiker (2001) COnfiTI11 this in that they conclude that the quantity and quality of financial disclosure is negatively related to the cost of equity capital for compames. (2003) {tpat IPO prospectuses are likely to be especially accurate because companies are liable Wr any misleading Of inaccurate infom1ationj'Although the same could be said about other repOliing media including the annual repOli it can be observed that the --------prospectus usually contains more information about future expetiations regarding market developments and earnings, strategic direction and intent, management and board composition. etc., compared to the annual repon from the same firm. This is at least the case for a number of Scandinavian prospectuses that have been examined by the authors of this paper. However. there are likely to be substantial differences in national legislation and traditions with r""-peet to disclosure in prospectuses. In a recent study of disclosure ill interim repoli of Greek flnns by admission of securities to Athens Stock Exchanges, lVlavricli" (2002) nOled for instance that annual reports as they are used in other countries are not very common among Greek mediLUn-sized finns.
At the time of admission for listing on the stock exchange, the company publishes its IPO prospectus in order to market the share to investors. An admission to listing on the stock exchange offers a unique oPpolilll1ity to study the amount and type of voluntary infonnation considered for disclosure to the capital market Thus, Mather ei af (2000) argue that management has an incentive to present the company in the best possible light in order to maximise the proceeds of tile share issue (see also Aharony 1 '1 aI., 1993) . Although this could lead to earnings management. managers of companies involved in taking a company public have incentives to present the underlying infonnation in the most favorable light possible (l\1ather et aI., 20(0) . Tlms, the IPO proSpecUlS provides insight into which types of in[onllatiOl1 are selected by a company and its advisors for presenting the company in relation to ilweslors and analysts. Admission for listing on the stoc); exchange requires the company to report about its achievements, skills and grO\vth potential in a reliable and sober manner, in order to demonstrate to investors that investing in the company will most likely generate a competitive retUl11. Tbis effOli to attract investors is <,entred on the 11'0 prospectus, which clarifies the company's financial capability, perionnance, operdtioll, skills, and the resoCU'ces through which it intends to prove continued growth and imTeased shareholder wealth. With regard to this aspeti., Ang and Brau (2002) show that greater company transparency before the initial is;me decreases the flotation costs of the IPO, and Schrand and \' elTeccilia (2004) find that greater disclosure frequency in the period prior to the lPO is associated with less underpricing.
The annual report has not only investors as its readers as it also conveys information to employees. potential employees, customers, the press and other stakeholders. Compared to that the lPO prospectus have a more limited group of readers than annual reports, and some differences in extent of disclosure can be expected. Cumpared to annual reports, prospectllses can be expected to provide additional disclosure of the company's long-tenll strategy, a specification of leading non-financial indicators relevant in assessing the efIectivene&<; of the sU'ategy implementation, comprehensive disclosure on company risks, and a discussion of the relation bcnvcen leading indicators and future profits (Cumby and Conrad, 2(01).
Disclosure
A substantial body of research conducted from an iniornlation-economics perspective has concentrated on studying why companies disclose more information than is required by regulation. \In relation to 11'0 prospectuses, Jenkinson and Ljungquist (2001) In this paper, we study the extent of voluntary disclosure in Danish IPO prospectuses and investigate whether this can be explained by-four control yariables --industry differences, managerial ownership before the IPO, company size and company age. The first factor. industry differences. has previously been used to explain differences in disclosure in annual reports by Adrem (l999) and Cooke (1989) because there are differences in industry disc.losllre norms (see Gibbins ct al" 1990). As intellectual capital is regarded as being especially-impOltant in high-tech industries, it is anticipated that IT and biotechnology companies will disclose more infOlmatioll than traditional manufactming and commercial companies. Fl1l1her, since the market-To-book values of IT and biotechnology companies are generally higher, the disclosure of measures that lie outside the traditional accounting realm is likely to be relath-ely more important.
Turning to a corporate governance perspedive, the second factor, managerial ownership before the IT'O, may influence companies' disclosure practices and thus the extent of disclosure in the 11'0 prospectus. The existence of some degree of managerial ownership in the company is a mechanism for ensuring management -shareholder alignment of interests (Demirag el £II., 2000, p. 348) . According to O'Sullivan (2000. p. 4Q9J. we can expect less disclosure from management if there is significant fllanagerial ownership. In accordance with this line of argumenl, directors of the board who themselves do not own a substantial portion of the company can be expected to encourage more intensive auditing and disclosure becaw;e they are more likely to perceive them-selyes as fulfilling a monitoring role. Similarly, Hossain e/ Ill. (1994) , in a study of listed lVlalaysian companies, conclude that the amount of voluntary disclosure varies with ownership structure.
Other factors such as fim1 size and internationali7Altiol1 arc also likely to influence disclosure. Robb 1'1111 Robb 1' . (2001 , for instance, find that larger finns and finn; with a global focus provide higher levels of both forward-looking and histOlic-a1 non-financial disciosures in their annual repons than other firms, while they in the same study only find minimal industry and country effects.
This leads us to the third category of research, where company size has been related to the amolmt of voluntary disclosure. Empirical studies date back to the 1950s. where, for example, Anton (1954) concluded that one-third of hrge American and Canadian companies regularly present results to stockholders while the corresponding figure.s 
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pro\'iding illfonnalion are more prohibitive for srnall companies, The latter problem tends (0 grow \\ith increased disclosure.
However, another factor to be considered is that J..'1fger companies, when compared to smaller ones, seem less risky to investors and have belter access to resources. Small companies thus have greater incentives (0 reduce uncertainty by disclosure. This argument preStulleS that a small company -all other things being equal -should disclose more infonnation and more details on competitors than is the case for a large company. These implications have been supported in studies by, for ex<unple, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) and Adrem (1999). However, not all studies conclude that the size of the company is a signiricant factor in explaining voluntary publication of illfonnatioll. For instance, Wallace (1988) and Stanga (1976) who conclude that size is not a si,!,'1lificam fador in explaining differences in companies' reporting between Nigeria and the USA.
Finally, company age has often been seen as a proxy for risk in the sense that the more established comp<Ulies are Jess risky. From this perspedive, the extent of a company's disclosure is expected to be related to how many years it has been in business. For example, Kim and Ritter (1999, p. 430) provide evidence that non-financial information is of greater importance in the valuation of younger companies because forecast earnings work better for assessing younger companies than historical earnings do (see Klein, 1996; Amir and Lev, 1996) . Furthermore, Jaggi (1997, p. 314) demonstrates that the number of years the company has been ill business influences the accuracy of the forecasts disclosed in IPO prospectuses. These results indil'ate that there might be a negative relationship between the age of the company and the extent of its disclosure, From the prior empirical research outlined above, the four hypotheses below are developed. As none of the literdture reviewed above relates directlv to disclosures in connection with lPG's, and because there are varying competing explanations the hypotheses are stated in the null form:
Hi. Industry dzzterellces, There is no ass(xiation with respect to disclosure of information on intellectual capital between companies in high-tech industries (IT and biotechnology) and traditional manufacturing ,md commercial compames, H2. Jlanageri<1i ownership. There is no assex.'lation between the amolmt of disclosure on intellectual capital and the existence of managerial ownership before the IPO.
H3. Cmnpal1Y size. There is no association between the amount of disclosm-e on intellectual capital <Uld the size of the company.
H4. Company age,
There is no association between the amount of disclosure on intellectual capital and the age of the ftnn.
These factors have been raised and studied in the disclosure literature and can contribute with insights with resped to understanding the mechanisms of disclosure in connection with an IPo. Wnile HI might be explained by industry nonns and institutionalized disclosure practices and furthermore that there are si,gnificant differences in competitive aspects aLTOSS industry groups, the three latter control variables (H2, H3, Hi) primarily concem the minimization of risk from (he investors perspective. Pre-IPO managerial ownership is an important factof, because it indicates to potential investors whether the people who know the most about the future prospects of the company, namely its present management team, consider" the company a good investment. Age and size are proxies for the chance of the company going bankmpt. i.e. age concerns the history of the company and size relates to whether it has critical mass to sun'ive a fierce competitive environment over time.
Methodology
In the empirical pat1 of this paper, a disclosw'e index is used to quantify the amount of infonnation regarding intellectual capital included in the prospectuses. This tool has most often been applied to quantify the extent of disclosure in annual reports (e.g. Hossain et al, 1994; Adrem, 1999) . However, its application is not limited to annual reporting, although it has also in been applied to 1PO prospeLiuses by Cumby and
Conrad (2001) as well as Guo et al. (2004) , who studied product-relatedlPO disclosure in biotechnology companies. The disclosure index methodology consists of the calculation of the mm1ber of infonnation-re1ated items that a given report contains, based on a predefined list of the possible index items. Items such as the distnbution of turnover between geographical segments, number of patents. and influence of research on staff satisfaction afe examples of items, which could be included in the index. The number of items included in the index varies between the specific studies. BalTett (1976) , for example, includes only 17 items in his index and in Cooke's (1989) study as many as 224 items were included.
Further, tbe disclosure index can include only voluntary inforn1atioll (Adrem, 1999; Hossain et al, 1994; Gray ei al., 1995; Guthrie and Petty, 20(0) , mandatory infonnation (Wallace et al., 1994) , or both voluntary and mandatory infommtion (Inchausti, 1997;  Beattie ef al., 2oo2b). See also rvlarston and Shrives (1991) for a more detailed description of the use and methodology of disclosure indices. The particulat· research design was chosen for our study because the disclosure index approach represents a proxy for the quality of disclosure of intellectual capital in !P(1 prospectuses. \\'hen applying such an approach, it is, however, important to consider tbe reliability of the results and the objectivity of the study (Unennan, 20(1] ). In the present study, these criteria are bandIed through a thorough literature review, dear instructions in the coding process and verifying the coding through separate coding br multiple researchers.
It can be argued that the amount of disclosure might not be an exact indicator of disclosme quality (Beattie et aL 2004, p. 210) . However, as we are concerned with extent of disclosure, we ilnd the disclosure index method to fulfill our requirements satisfactorily. Beattie et a1. (2004, p. 213 ) also express concerns in relation to the ability of a "one·dimensional'· approach to the study of a complex, multi·faceted concept. Thus, their reservations relate to lo","~s of detail in the data that such methods lead to. Despite this, Guthrie et al. (2004) suggest this method as a fmitfnl avenue for future research into vollmtary disclosures in business reporting.
The disdosure index
111ere are no widely accepted theoretical guidelines for sek'Cting items; therefore, the successful use of the disclosure index methodology depends on critical and cautious
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selection of items (Marston and Shrives, 1991) . As the focus of this article is voluntary information, the choice of items was based on a thorough inspection of the literature on coll)orate disclosure (see Eccles and l'vlavrinac, 1995; AICPA, 1994; Blair and Wallman, 2001; Beattie el aI., 2002b; Beattie and Pratt, 2002£1) and intellectual capital reporting (Guthrie and Petty, 2000; DATI. 2001; S\'eiby, 1997) . Regarding intellectual capital statements, the experiences and re::.ults of the major Danish project concernulg intellectual capital statements (DATI, 2001; DrvlSTI. 2(03) were a major source of ---------insight. Since the analysis ionlses on the voluntary extent of disclosure in lPO Table L The disdosure index (78 item$) prospectuses, information required by the authorities was not included in the index.
In our study of the extent of voluntary disclosme of non-accounting information -, e.g. infOlmation on knowledge-based resources, strategy and processes -in D-dl1ish lPO prospectuses, a disclosure index consisting of 78 items was applied. Table I show that these items were divided into six different categories and provide infonnation on the number of items in each category. All items in the disclosure index are listed in Table II .
The extent of disclosure was quantified as the percentage of recorded infonTlation items found in the prospectus. In other words, dle IPO prospectus is given one point if a given index item is found in the prospectus and no points if the given item is not found in the prospectus. This can be seen in the following fonnula, which was used to calculate the index score of each IPO prospectus: Efh.'fb related 10 l1w wurldtlA' rI1Vironml:,nt Working-froJ11 home Value addcrVemph)'yee 
The full list of lPOs was obtained from the Stock Exchange, and the actual 68 IrO prospectuses were obtained either from the companies themselves or from the underwriting banks. For the purpose of our analysis, we only considered the disclo",rre in the IPO prospectuses. The average disclosure of all the indicators included in our disclosure index is 22 per cenl. varying from Lundbeck's (Danish pharmaceutical company, [PO in 1999) prospectus, which discloses 51 per cent of the prorxlsed voluntary information itE'ms, to SparE'kassen Svendborg's UYdnish bank, 1PO in 199m, which does not disclosE' any of the items at all. Of the overall categories of the disclosure index, "strategic statements" and "customers" are the informationl'<ltegories where most infomJalion is disclosed, both a verdging 28 per cent across lhe total sample (see Table II for all sub-totals and disclosure percentages). However, when the time period is taken as a whole, it is still the production and trading companies that dominate listings on the stock exchange, encompassing ~t4 IPO listings out of 68. DtslTiptive statistics for the three continuous variables "age", "size", and "managerial ownership before the !PO" are shoml in Table IV . In most cases the data for these variables were comained ill the prospectus but otherwise the tinns were contacted or the data were obtained from the Danish register of finns with limited liability _
Results
In Table V , the average disclosure per prospectus has been calculated as described above and divided into the six different categories depicted in Table L In interpreting the data, it should be kept in mind that although all Danish !PO proSpeliuses over a A possible explanation is that until 1999 disclosure of information on intellectual capital was a simple way or signalling an attractive IrO in the same way lilat that the mere naming of companies as "dot.com" attracted investors (see Lee, 2(XJ1) . However, after the tech stock crash, behaviourdl patterns might have changed so radically that e\-en though there was not a great difference in the tnJes of companies going public before and after the break point, after the break point there was measurable reluctance in disclosing the types of information that the "dot-com's" used to disclose. technology, phannaceutical and biological engineering is statistically significant.
These differences are consistent with the studies by Cooke (1989, 1991) and Meek et ai (1995) who also conduded thaI the ratio of voluntary disclosure varies across industries. Sinc" the number of Danish IPO prospectuses is limited it was decided to aggregate the initial four industries into two main sectors, the high-tech comp11sing and low-tech sectors for the remainder of the analysis.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA). controlling for technological type of the company (high-tech/low-tech), was used to test if the extent of managerial ownership before the IPO. company age and company size influenced disclosure. In order ro conduct dle A .. "iOVA analysis, we divided the data on the independent variables into diS<.Tete groups in order to determine whether there is an effecl on disclosure as the presumed dependent variable.
The extent of "managerial ownership before the !PO" wa:; classified according the existence of such managerial ownership in the company at the time of 11'0 or not. This variable was thus measured as either "no pre-II'O managerial ownership" or "pre-iPC) managerial ownership" in the cases where this was present. The variable 'company age' was measured ill years and operationali:-;ed by distinguishing between young companies and old compimies where enterprises aged less than 20 years were considered as young companies. Lastly, "company size" was treated by di\'iding the data into small companies -of less than 2c' >O employees -and large companies -of 250 employees or more.
HI. ]ndllstlY dz[ierenu's
The independent variable "technology type" has a significant influence on the extent of disclosure. high-tech companies disclosing almost twice as much information (31.7 per cent) as low-tech companies (l6A per cent). It is not surprising that this vaIiable is significant. as we wert able to group our industrial categories according to this characteristic in the previous section. Moreover, this result may be compared to those of other studies indicating that investors and analysts engaged in knowledge-intensive indusu·ies -for example technological and pham1aceU1ical companies -find (l\Iavrinac and &lyle, 1996; l\1avrinac and Siesfeld, 1997) .
The difference between sectors abo supports that companies witll more intellectual capital need to disclose more voluntary non·1inancial information because increased information can help to reduce invest{~rs' uncertainty and, thereby, ensure that the company in question does not have to pay a high premium due to investors' perceived information risk. However, the difference could also be that industry norms for disclosUte (see Gibbins et aL, 1990) affed the finn's disclosure as is suggested by Mather ct al. (2000) who find industry differences in the use of graphs in Australi,m IPO prospectuses.
H2. J,Jaliagerialownership
The extent of management ol\11ership before the 11'0 was abo found to have signiilcant influence on the amOUl1l of disclosure. Companies where management had an o\mership share in the company at the time of listing on the stock exchange disclosed more information on intellectual capital. Note that this result is quite surptising and contrary to the literature previously cited (Den1irag et al, 2000 ; O'Sullivan, 20m). Our statistical analysis indicated that managetial ownership plior to the IPO had a positive effect on the companies' disclosure. A company where managerial ownership Ivas present ptior to the [PO disclosed on average 26,4 per cent as opposed to 17.1 per cent for the companies without managelial ownership before the 11'0. The question of why this was the case cannot be answered within the context of this study, One possible explanation, however, might be that managers have a greater incentive to market the company, as the resulting lower cost of capital will directly affect their profit from the offering.
H3. Company sb:c
The analysis did not find significant correlation between "company size" expressed ill terrns of number of employees and the extent of disclosure Since the number of obseryations is limited, the possible disconfirmation oj \" elTecchia's (1983) proprietary costs them'v, furthennore confirmed by, e.g. Inchausti (1997) , should be taken as a tentative conclusion. However. the results should be viewed inlhe light of the specific situation of the companies at the time of the publication of their 11'0 prospectuses. The companies in our study are about to be listed on Ille stock exchange, hence although they inevitably differ relative to companv size, regardless of the size of the company, the flotation costs are very similar.
H4. Company age
A 1so. our analysis did not find any significant difference \"ith respect to the independent valiable "age". In relation to the perceived risk of ilwesting in a company, age is a part of documenting that the company has been, and therefore in the future will be, able to sustain itself. Our results thus indicate that (lIe history of the company does not matter to the capital marl,et, although the tTack record of companies is continuously emphasized by capital market actors. This might indicate that it is the track record of present management te,ml or the managing director, rdther lhanthe age of the compimy that matters. No previous :;tudi(''s have elaborated further 011 this aspect. wherefore it is an interesting avenue for further investigation.
Discussion
The results of our analyses lead us to three tentative conclusions. First. the results regarding industry differences supports the proposition that intangibles-intensive companies need to disclose more non·accounting information (Hi J. Possibly. in order to lower their risk premium. Second, there was an indication that nk'magement ownership creates incentives for greater disclosure (H:''j. This result was in opposition to previow; findings. but could. possibly. be explained by the fact that the time of lPO, which is our Disclosure of information 727 specific focal point. is a unique case. The reasoning behind this is that management has ---------a greater incentive to disclose information when they too will profit from the st(xk market listing. They are thus more interested in conveying the intrinsic value of lhe company to the stock market. Interestingly. this difference does not prevail for the high·tech companies -something that could haw been expected -as the TPO profits generally are assumed to be greater there. Thus, we can also (1Jllclude that the technology factor weighs more than the ownership factor when it comes to the extent of disclosure. The result that "size" (H3) and "age" (HI) are not significant individually contradicts a number of earlier studies (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Adrem, 1999; Kim and Ritter, 1999; Jaggi. 1997 ). Although it is importanllo note that our conclusion is based on a rather small dataset, it could indicate that there are other organizational characteristics. which are more decisive. Our analysis indicates that industry characteristics play a greater role in the assessment of how much infommtion companies should disclose in order to facilitate the capital market's valuation analyses.
The results indicate here that it is the old/large low·tech companies, which distin!<,'trish themselves from the other three possible categories. This result is in accordance with the cost of disclosure theory. which states that the costs for this type of company \vill be relatively lower.
Concluding remarks
Voluntary disclosure of infonnation on intellectual capital in Danish IPO pro::,Vecluses has increased substantially in the last deL'lde. This development can partly be related to the fact that relatively more IT and pharmaceutical companies have been listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in the later ye,m; covered by our study. but also that the prospectuses of these types of companies generally include more information on intellectual capital. These results correspond to the suggestion in the literature that companies relying mainly on intangible as,;ets for value creation -for example highly-educated staff. R&D, patents etc. -have to disclose more varied non·accounting information in order to reduce information asymmetry between management and external stakeholders. Our analysis showed that grouping the companies into high-tech and low· tech sectors. revealed significant differences between high-tedl and low·tech sectors with regard to the disclosure of voluntary non·accounting information. Likewise. the extent of management ownership before the IPO had a signific;mt inflUEnce on the extent of voluntary non·accounting disclosure in the IPO prospectuses. On the other hand age and company size were found insignificant. The four control variables included in the study relate to hypothesis regarding industry nom1:; (HI) and the minimization of investor uncertainh' ()i2. H3, Hi).
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In relation to the future development of bm;iness reporting practices. DiPiaz7A and Eccles (2002) advocate for an approach that considers differences in relevance of infonnation across industries ;1,; is also reflected in the indru3try differences that we find. Pre-lPO managerial ownership (HZ) concerns tile minimizing of uncertainty for potential investors as it indicates whether management has money on the line too. Our results indicate that when management has money on the line. they tend to clischse more information on intellectual capital.
An influence of size on the extent of disclosure could be evidence of the much-cited cost OJ disclosure theory (see Verrecchia, 1983 ). However, as our results were indecisive, they might indicate that the cost of disclo;,-ure theory does not have a significant imponance in the present era of more advanced accounting systems and instant reporting. Finally. the variable age was indecisive as well. This might be attributed to the fact that analysts and investors do not regard the [00 clisum! past of the company important Furlhemlore, the suggestion was made that perhaps it was not the age or track r~'ord of the company itself that mattered, but rather it was the track record of the existing management team that was the iocus of the capital market As these possihle explanations could not be tested using the approach adopted in ilie st~udy they can be suggested as area.s for future l-esearch.
It is often stated that the current level of mandatory disclosure of infonnation is not sufricicnt to convey a true picture of the company's present value and future prospects and that supplementary information on, e.g. intellectual capital should he disclosed. However, at the same time, thtl'e are reservations as to whether supplemental)' business reporting is a credible me,ms of voluntary disclosure and whether indicator,; of such information are relevant. Therefore, this paper has fcx-'Ussed on the reporting of such non-accounting infonnation in IPO prospectuses as inionnation disclosed here was suggested to comprehend information that the capital market would find important. As films issuing the !PO prospectus altempt to address the needs of the capital market, we believe that the actual disclosure practises in IPO prospectuses give insights into the capital market's need for infonnation.
The disclosure of infonnation on intellectual capital in 11'0 prospectuses, which has been the focus of this paper, indicates that companies and their advisors believe that tbis type of information is important in tbe capital market's as.sessment of the company's value. Ilowev-er, in order to be more specitic about the motives behind the disclosure of intellectual capital, in JPO prospectuses and other supplementary reports, for example, intellectual capital statements, and about how this infoffilation will fOlm tbe basis of the market's assessment of tlle WmpallY, it is necessary to look more dir~'1ly at the work of the analysLs and imestors. This could be done using research interviews as was dOlle, e.g. by Holland (20()4) who provides evidence iliat both analysts and fund managers consider information on inteJl~1ual capital in their flUldamental mosaic of infomtation. which is the wmerstone of their discussions with and about the company.
Finally, a more detailed understanding of companies' motives for disclo::.l.lfe as well as analysts' and investors' need for infonnation should make the link to the compallies' cost of equity capital. Schrand and Verrecchia (2004) have demonstrated that gfe'dter disclosure frequency in the period prior to the 11'0 is ass(xiated with lower lmder-pricing as well as some of the more traditional measures of a companies' cost of c-dpital sllch as bid-ask spread and analyst forecast dispersion also will be lower. The purpose of this article is to analyse the [mancial infonnation needs 0' bond investors based on disclosures from US municipal annual reports and budgets.
Investors are considered the primary user group of coonnerciaI financial infonnation (FASB, 1978) and, along with citizen groups and oversight organizations. a major lJ...;;er group of govermnental financial discl<sures (GASH, 1!8:i). Disclosure indexes are developed based on information available from annual reports and budgets as measures of disclosure quality. The indexes are measured against sumlgates for information incentives of municipal bond investors and related organizations (including bond raters and underwriters). These disclosure incentives will be based on information incentives between bond investors and municipality administrators.
The focus of this project is financial disclosures beyond minimum ger erally accepted accounting principals (GAAP) requirements. Why do some large municipalities present considerable non·GAAP information and some do not? It is posited that incentives of key actors involved in the process determine di& losure levels, after controlling for structural and regulatory differences. The article concentrates on the incentive structures of (I) municipal bond investors '1el'SUS (2) professional and elai:ed administrators.
This project uses the same database and is an extension of Giroux (}989). Giroux (1989) used public choice theory to test political disclosure incentives associated with voter and bureaucratic behaviour. Empirical results pnlVided support for both perspectives, especially associated with budget disclosuns. The variables associated with the current project consider investor/creditor needs rather than political processes.
btvestor Incentives and Economic Theory
The limited accounting literature focusing on municipal discl<sure indicates positive disclosure incentives Municipalities with superior financial charactmstics AAA] 6,1 64 can signal this information through the financial reporting process, including additional disclosures beyond minimum GAAP requiremerts (Evans and Patton, 1983) . Under an agency framework, principals have the JltressaTy incentives to monitor agents. However. the incentives for gathering information associated with political processes are less than for market proces5tS. The reason is that there is less ability to capture benefits from political processes (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . Thus, voters may pay little attention to financial information ------of governments (a COI'ICePt called ~rational ignorance"), but nnmicipal bond dealers and investors should be very interested in financial information. Govenmten1: administrators are responsible for public accountability including financial credibility. From the perspective of the investors the ability of the government to pay its debts is crucial. Thus, discUrure is importmt to government amnillisttators to maintain the credit rating, the ability to tap credit markets in the future, and keep interest rates on new debt as low as possibJe[lJ Baber and Sen (1984) identified contracting and regulation incentives for adequate disclosure. Contracts require agents (e.g. bureaucra:s) to discIOle financial information reflecting the agents' actions. Baber and Sen ~ Iso posited the use of standard reporting practices to reduce information costs. Regulation of financial reporting reduces the liability of the goVernntent to the private sector associated with misleading or inadequate disclosure. Evans and Patton (1983) focused on marJagmtent ince:ltives (especially the city manager) for disclosure. Certificate of Conformance (now Certificate of Achievement) participation was hypothesized to relate to the recognition ofhigh quality management and lower cost of debt Evans and Pattm viewed theCertificate as an individual accomplishment of the chief exa:utive (especially the city manager). One result of quality managentent was posited to be a low€r interest rate on new borrowing.
The analysis of long-term debt has been an important d:sclosure factor in the aa:ounting literature. A survey of ronnnercial bankers incicated that total debt outstanding was the most important factor in evaluating municipal securities (Boyett and Giroux, 1978) . The user needs survey conducted by the Governmental Aa:ounting Standards Board (GASB) demonstrated the importance of debtrelated disclosures by goveruments' such as historic trends in borrowing and future debt service requirements Qones, 1985) . In a study (.f the municipal bond market, Ingram and Copeland (1~ found long-term debt l=er capita a significant indicator of systematic risk and change in yield premium. The bond indenture is an arms-length contract, which may require debtor ompliance and bond investor-related monitoring. Bondholders price debt consistent with risk characteristics. High risk should be associated with higher interest rates and, perhaps, more monitoring/control mechanisms such as rec,'Uired financial ratios (e.g. required levels of cash or debt) or financial audits. Municipalities may receive lower interest rates with standardized or complete reporting, which emphasizes quality management and facilitates the analysis of fiscal stress (Zimmerman, 1977) .
Bondholders are external to the political process and depend on contractual relationships with municipalities to protect their interest;(2~ The primary amcern of investors is the financial viability of the goverrnnent to ensure the uninter:-upted receipt of interest and principal payments. Considerable evidence exisls that investors hase their analysis on financial disclosure and the risk prenlllIU that Government Accounting Disclosure investors demand for increased bond default potential is based, in part, on the quality of financial disclosures [3] . It is expected that inve.i:or-related disclosure _ _ _ _ _ _ 65_ will be directly related to the 1eveI of importance of long-term debt to the llll.lllicipality, the need for future bond issues, structural characteristics of the gowrnmmt. the regulatory environment including the existence of financial monitoring tedmiques, and independent external evaluations of the government's financial condition.
Ingram (1984) used an index of disclosure quality of state governments to analyse the association of economic factors to accounting practices[41 Factor analysis identified eight variables including income, revenue, salaries, urbanization, population and debt Regression analysis indicated that disclosure quaJity-elated to political competition, newspaper circulation, urbanization, and when the accounting administrator is selected by the governor.
In an earlier study Giroux (1989) tested the hypothesis that voters dominate political processes (based on the median voter model-MVM) versus the hy!> xhesis that bureaucrats dominate the processes (bureaucratic model-BM). The IIledian voter domina tion requires access to key financial information, while burea .x:ratic power stresses the monopoly position of bureaucrats over information and the likelihood that the bureaucracy would provide data strategically to voters and elected officials based on their own incentives. Testing was based on disdosure indexes from annual reports and budgets of large cities. Results provided sJppOrt for both models. Budget: disclosures provided some support for the MVM, ronsistent with the political nature of the budget process. The disclosure indexes a.<.snciated with the annual report generally supported BM incentives (i.e. lower disclosure levels) and less support for MVM. One interpretation of these results is that political decisions are based on budget information, while the annual report disclosures do not f<x:us on political considerations. This interpretation Stggests that the investor model developed in this article may be a better fit to the mnual report disclosure indexes than the budget index.
Accounting Disclosure Giroux (1989) modelled the disclosure practices of large US cities relative to the key actors involved in political processes: voters, elected officials, bureaucrats and public employees. The present study uses the same database t(l make comparisons between the investor-based incentives and the incentives of key political actors from the earlier study. Annual reports and budgets were requested from the 167 large cities and one or both were received from 133 cities. This study uses fiscal year 1983 annual reports and budgets to prepare three disclosure indexes. The rationale for this approoch was presented in Giroux (lgffi. p.9): AAAJ 6,1 66 At that time generally acc.!pted 3<.wuntingprinciples (GAM') for sMe and local governments were based 011 pronounCffilffits of the Natiooal CoonciJ on Governmotltal Acrotmting (NCGA). Financial disclosure was primarily based 011 NCGA Statement 1 (lJ79), which identified the criteria for the romprehensiYe annual financial report (CAFR) and ~ purpose fmandal statements. The CAFR provided for both aggregate reporting (oornbined financial Slatements) and detailed financial analysis (e.g oomhining and individual fund !itatements~ In addition to these integm!ed statements, NCGA Statement 1 recomrnend'I (but dues not requir!') a set of 15 statistical tables. Munidpaliries also preparedannual reporting bud;~ets befure the start of the fiscal year. HoweYer, there was no budget·related "GAAP". Therefore budget disclosure format and quality should have been based on bureaucracy-city rouncil regotiatiollS High quality bndgets were expa.'ted only if rounciJ member.; bad the incentives t~ demand them.
Disclosure indexes were prepared for: (1) typical characteristics in the annual operating budget; (2) pension and employee benefit disclosures in the annual report; and (3) typical disclosures presented in the statistical section of the annual report The budget index was based on eight 0-1 factors of disclosJre quality, including whether or not a variance analysis was included, programme descriptions. line item summary data and a budget message. This informat.on could be useful to investors to estimate future cash flows •. but seems particularly important to voters and other constituents to derennine public output Th? budga is considered an expression of public policy by the GASB (GASB, 1900) The pension and employee benefits discloser index was based on 19 pensionrelated items and eight employee benefit factors (e.g. vacation and sick pay disclosures), The data base precedes GASB Statement Nc 5 (1986) on pension disclosures. Therefore, disclosure scores should be dept!I1dent on disclosure incentives associated with key users rather than GAAP requirements.
Twenty-two statistical section disclosure items are measJTed. based primarily 00 tbedisclcsure~ofNCGASlarement 1 Since ~1WXlUt~!ldatms are not GAAP, disclosure leveJs should be based on the incer,tives of goverrunents. A summary of the disclosure indexes is presented in Appendices 1 and 2. (See Giroux 1989 for a detailed analysis of the disclosure indel!es.)
Investor Incentives
It is posited that issuing long·term debt at the lowest possible interest rate is important to municipalities. Therefore, mwricipal managers would be responsive to investor demands for financial information. The importaoc'e of the annual report in this regard has been well established:
Investors and creditors use J!OYeI1IlIl"I1tal financial reports for one primary IJUrl)<l'e: to asanain the ability of a government to repay its debt •.. Investorn and creditomare particularly inta'ested in the amount of debt and its structure, litigation, other actual and rontingtnt liabilities, and cash all3ilablt> to pay obligation" In addition, investorsand creditor.; compare budgrled revenues and expenditures to evaluate the ability of a governmental unit to Ii-Ie within its means (Jones, 1985, pp. 30·31) .
Since budget to actual comparisons are available in the alnual report, it is not known whether the annual budget is important for financial analysis by investors.
The three disclooures indexes are based 00 non-GAAP dis::kl>ures. The 22 factocs related to statistiml tables focus on items ma,1; likely to be of interest to inH~8tors. The items include several debt-related calculations (eg. overlapping debt, debt per capita, annual debt service percentage), information related to cash flow trends (e.g. property tax levied and collected, 10 years; expenditures by functions, 10 years), as well as economic conditions (e.g. personal income, unemployment rate, contingencies). It is posited that this index !1la'!t closely matches expected dis:1osure Government Accounting Disclosure 67 needs of investors. This interpretation is based on survey information 00 llrlestors -------(~, espelial1y Jones (1005) and Boyett and Giroux (1978) ). The pension and €11~
benefit index includes salary-related items not required under GAAP at tl!e time.
Since salary represents the major expenditure category of municipalities and influences the amount of cash available for future debt service, sophisticated investors are expected to evaluate this technical information. The existence of major pension and other employee-benefit liabilities may impact on the availability of future cash flows to service debt. Therefore. investors are posited to demand disclosures beyond minimum GAAP requirements. The budget index considers only eight basic characteristics of typical budget disclosures. but should lapture general investor interest in budget analysis. It provided the highest level of expl<mat«y power based on J{l-in Giroux (1989). The primary and secondary municipal bond market are competitive and municipalities that issue significant amounts of general obligation bonds and other long·term debt have incentives to disclose information of interest t() bond underwriters and investors to obtain the lowest possible inrerest:rates and maintain their creditworthiness. However, bureaucrats have incentives to limit financial disclosures (Giroux, 1989)_ Therefore, the extent of disclosure should depend on relative incentives. For example, as the level of debt increases the incenl ives to increa..<:e investor-related disclosure should be greater.
Four categories of variables will be used to analyse disclosure level~ in the context of investor needs:
(1) financial ratios; (2) structural factors; (3) regulation; and (4) external evaluation of disclosure and creditworthiness. These represent factors related to investor incentives and control variables. Financial variables connect to potential investor evaluation of financial disclosure. Structural and regulation variables are control variables that can affect dis:losure levels. External evaluation may be a surrogate for management signalling.
Three financial variables will be tested: total long-term debt outstanding per capita (DEBT), intergovernmental grants as a percentage of total revenues (IG), and general fund balance per capita (FB). As pointed out by Ingram (1984, p. 130) : "Larger dependency on external funding sources could lead to inneased disclosure". Debt and intergovernmental grants represent the major cat~gories of external funding. The level of debt outstanding should be the primary incentive AAAJ 6,1 68 for investor·related disclosure levels (that is, the ability of l~ts to issue new debt at the lowest possible interest rate depends, in par~ on full disckslre of information demanded by investors). As DEBT rises, municipalities have greater incentives to increase disclosure levels. A positive coefficient is expected. IG represents the. bulk of non-local revenues. Intergovernmental grants often represent the largest single revenue source for cities actively seeking state and local funding.
This variable is used as a surrogate for state or federal gc vernment regulation ------Ongrarn. 1984). No sign is predicted. A positive roefficient would suggest superior government regulation and monitoring to ~ the level of financial disclosure (e.g auditing requirements). A negative sign woukI sugge;t that high ~tal grant levels woukI replace the need to issue additional long-term debt. thus reducing disclosure incentives to investors. FB is a measure of available operating equity. a "cushion" available for future spending. General fund equity can be used for ordinary operating purposes and normally is available to cover interest and principal payments through operating transfers to debt service fund>. It is unknown how FB affects disclosure incentives and the direction of the sign is unknown. A negative sign may indicate that the government is ~insulated· from pressures associated with the need for additional debt A positive sign may repn'Sellt a signal of high quality financial management (Evans and Patton, 1983) .
Structural factors relate to characteristics of individual municipalities that may impact on disclosure levels. The chief executive may be either a mayor or city manager, i.e. an elected official or a professional Jll31Ja!:eT. This is measured as a dummy variable (G). where a 1 represents a city ma!la!:eT chief executive. A o represents a mayor as chief executive. A positive sign is prediLied A city manager has bureaucratic incentives to limit disclosure, but as a professional manager should be infJuenced by investor incentives (e.g. as the level of debt and concomitant interest payments increase) (Evans and Patton, 1983) . A strong agency relationship exists between the appointed city manager and the city council. Council members have the authority to fITe tne city manager and may also attempt to manoeuvre the manager into taking the blanr for controversial decisions. Hence, the city manager may resort to extensive iItformation disckslre to thwart such council member strategies[5}. A mayor is expected to be more interested in political factors. Mayors are elected managE1"S who, like the city manager, must work with the colmcil. However, the dominar,t agency relationship in this form of government is between the mayor and the voters (fugram and Dejong, 1987) . Mayoral effectiveness is associated with maintaining a constituent base; that is, the ability to be re-elected (Mayper, et al, 1991) .
The total number of funds used by a city (FUND) is a measure of operating complexity and control imposed by a city administration. No sign is predicted. A large number of funds increases reporting complexity, which may be difficult for users to evaluate. On the other hand. a major reason for using multiple funds is to increase accounting control. This may provide political and regulatory benefits, as well as additional information to specific inve,tors (e.g. on various outstanding debt issues).
A scaled variable is established to estimate the magnitude of auditor exo1>tions (AO). A 0 represents an unqualified opinion. A 3 is a major exception (su~h as a missing statement or inability to audit specific funds or fixed assets). A 1 is a technical exception such as a change in accounting principle for which the auditor concurs. A 2 is a relatively minor exception. A positive coefficient is exJeCted Investors should demand greater disclosure levels when auditor exceptions are reported.
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Municipalities can be highly regulated by states, although regulation intensity ------varies across the 50 states. Various state laws require specific accounti:Jg and auditing practices and may mandate a balanced budget. These regu:at1ons influence the disclosure environment. Three variables are included in the model to control for regulation. Most mlffiicipalities are subject to either or both state laws or city ordinances requiring some form of balanced budget. Thest range from no regulation through moderate requirements (e.g. expenditures lIIUSt equal revenues plus existing fund balance) to stringent (revenues must be equal or greater than expenditures). A categorical variable on budget laws (BL) wa£ scaled from 1 (no regulation) to 7 (revenues equal expenditures) representing increasingly severe balanced budget requirements. No sign is predicted for BL. B1-is an important factor in the operations of a city, but the impact on financial dis.:1osure is unknown. GAAP is a dummy variable where 1 represents a state law requiring financial statements presented according to GAAp, while AUD is a SUIte law dummy variable where I is an audit requirement. The regulations sh(.Uld be associated with higher disclosure scores; therefore, positive coefficients are expected for GAAP and ADD.
Finally, two variables represent external valuations of financial health and disclosure. The bond rating (BR) of a municipality is a general measure of fhancial health (often identified with fiscal stress), with higher bond ratings aSSlx:iated with stronger economic and financial conditions. BR is a dummy variabl€ where 1 is an Al or higher Moody's rating. Since disclosure levels are evaluated by the rating agencies. a higher rating should be assot:iated with higher disclasurt levels. The Government Finance Officers ASSlx:iation (GFOA) Certificate of AchiC'lement (CA) is awarded to state and local governments after a review team dete:."JJlines that they meet minimum disclosure standards of the annual report in accordance with GAAP. Evans and Patton (1983) associated the CA with quality management and lower interest rates on new debt. A positive sign is anticipated. Investors that analyse an annual report with a CA know that disclosure is complete and in accordance with GAAP. The external evaluation variables also can be inte-preted as alternative disclosure "indexes" rather than monitoring devices. Consequently, separate regressions will be run both with and without these factors.
SampleIData Selection
This project analyses financial disclosures of US L-lties over 100,<XX) in population. The primary sources of infomlation are the annual financiaJ report and the annual operating budget, which were requested by letter from aU 167 large cities for the fiscal year ended in 1983. Additional data sources include the 1984 Municipal AAA] 6,1
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Year Book, Surveying the States, and Bureau of the Census publications. Either or both annual reports or budgets were avaiJablefrom 1331ar)~cities. No published sources were available for budget laws; consequently, this information was obtained from telephone calls to the individual cities. Complete data were available for 110 cities. Descriptive information was analysed bas<~ on available data; however, regression runs were based on the no cities with complete data.
------Results
The variables used are summarized in Table l along with descriptive information.
This includes both the di~1ooure indexes and independent variables. The statistical index had an average score of 13.6 of 22 items tabulated. One city disclosed no items, while several had 20 or 21 (none of the cities had all 22 items). The employee index was the most complex, with a range of 0 to 70. Tht· average was almost 38. The budget index scores were larger than anticipated (since there are no budget disclosure standards), with an average score of 5. Moody's bond rating dummy, 1 = Al or higher rating CA:
Certificate of Achievement dummy, 1 = city awarded CA the model. The positive coefficients for FB and FUND suggest a strong equity position and complex reporting associated with an increased number of funds are associated with higher supplementary disclosure levels. i.e. high equity cities and those with complex fund structures provide more complete statistical disclosures. The negative sign of BL may represent invt'5tors favouring less restrictive budget control, i.e. greater restriction may inl-rease the probability for default on interest and principal payments at least in the short-term. When BR and CA are dropped from the model [{l falls to 26 per cent; however, six vruiab\es are significant, including all three financial ratios, G, FUND, and AUI>. The expected relationship of DEBT to disclosure levels is apparent in the reduced Government Accounting Disclosure model The negative coefficient for IG suggests that cities which rely more heavily 73 on intergovernmental grants rather than debt have lower disclosure incentives _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and provide less statistical information. City manager cities provide more complete statistical disclosures than mayoral cities, as do cities that were required b:r state law to be audited.
The results of the employee index were rather disappointing. The explanatory power was considerably less than the statistical index for both the full and rtrluced models and only two variables were significant in each. This suggests that investors are more interested in statistical section tables than employee-related disclosures. IG and CA were significant in the full model, while DEBT ;md IG were significant in the reduced model. As with the statistical index thereJa\i.)flShip of DEBT to disclosure levels is only apparent in the reduced model.
As expected the budget index was a poor predictor of investor incentivet Only G was significant; that is, city manager cities produced higher disclosure b'Jdgets (a structural factor). There was no indication that investor incentives had any impact on the budget document. This is consistent with the interpretation that the budget is a political document (the major finding of Giroux, 1989) , wr~le the annual report is primarily associated with investor analysis.
Conclusions
The purpose of this article was to analyse bond investor incentives for municipal disclosures as measured by three indexes of financial information avail<tble on the annual report and budget. These indexes measured: (1) tables present in the statistical section of the annual report; (2) pension and other employee benefit information present in the notes to the financial statements; and (3) basic budget disclosures. The model included financial ratios associated with other factors of possible interest to investors; structural factors associated with the management of the cities, fund accounting, and auditing results; state regulation of municipal accounting and budgeting items; and external measures of fiscal stress and disclosure quality.
The existence of a Certificate of Achievement was a significant variable in both annual report indexes, but not the budget index. The CA seems to be the best indicator of supplementary disclosure levels. When CA was excluded from the model DEBT became significant for both the statistical and en1ployee indexes. DEBT would seem to provide the greatest incentives for disclosure levels beyond AMJ 6,1 74 those required by GAAP, and this relationship is substantiated in the reduced model for the annual report indexes.
The statistical index was the most Sl1COSSfuI for measuriog inve:."tor incentives, both in terms of explanatory power and number of significant variables (six in the reduced model). On the other hand, the budget index was not associated with investor incentives.. Giroux (1989) used the same sample and the same indexe~ to measure financial disclosure in the context of public choice theory, comparing the incmtives of both politicians and voters versus the bureaucrats. The budget index yielded the best results, suggesting that the budget is primarily a political document. One interpretation of these results would be that most political (fecU;ions of a financial nature are based on the budget process. In a political ante".-t relatively little interest was associated with the annual report, a document that couJd be important for both feedback and control.
Although both the annual report and budget are political (iocuments, the present study suggests that investor incentives are more closely related to the annual report than the budget. The annual report is historical anc can be interpreted as a technical document on actual financial results of particular interest to investors and creditors. These results must be considered preliminary, but suggest future research on these two fmancia! documents. The budget is a planning, control and public policy· related document. The annual report also has political implications, but is more closely related to investor incentives.
An Alternative Perspective
The mode of interpretation used in this study makes the claims and evidence used to support the claims both partial and restrictive. We can summarize this partiality and restrictiveness in three related ways.
First, and most broadly, the rationality criteria used are economic (also called technico-adrninistrative). We asswnethat the incentives of 5(:lf·interested economic agents help predict the accounting phenomena under study. Such an approach is partial and a somewhat runtrived reduction of the empiJical domain in which governmental accounting exists. This results in the setting aside or bracketing of brooder social, political, institutional, technical and moral spheres of guvemmentaJ accounting's force within human experience [6] .
Second, we used a dichotomy between economic and political interests as a way to interpret differences between the processes that result in municipal financial statements and the processes involved in municipal budgeting. This is a contrived split, but perhaps a necessary one given the limits on what a single study can accomplish. Clearly, the production of financial statements isstrongiy influenced by political processes. These processes have to do with the political nature of accounting institutions and rules as well as the processes (If governance that are at work in specific governments. Thus, OUT conclusion that the budgeting process is more "political" than the annual financial reporting pro::ess is partial outside the confines of the dichotomy used.
Third, our methodology and lan~ are reductively empirical. We are affiysmg quantitative indices through a language of Jinear variance splitting driv~n by the rationality of inductive reasoning. There is nothing about our paradign that makes it a "better" way of describing accounting phenomena. Other approaches (e.g. hermeneutical, critical, casuistic, ethnographic) are equally capa')le of contributing to social science efforts to understand the complex environment of accounting.
Notes
L A delimitation of this study is the focus on investors. Voter.; and oversight bodies al '" may be interested in the financial analysis from the financial reporting process, but thi:; is not llpeCificallyaddressed in this article. Z. As defined by Giroux (1989) Sources: Annual reports and budil"l$ from each dry.
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